Both anaesthesia and intensive care are heavily dependent on the hospital's engineering system. It is almost an article of faith that the supply of oxygen, suction, nitrous oxide and medical breathing air will be maintained. The same is usually expected of the electrical supply. However, each of these may fail and as a result patients may be killed or maimed. This paper examines what monitoring of these supplies is appropriate for patient care.
Gas supplies
Unfortunately all the gases we use are si milar. being colourless, odourless, and supplied at similar pressures. There is no simple observation which will immediately distinguish one from another at a wall outlet. However, failure to receive sufficient oxygen may be fatal, so assurance of the supply is essential; this implies a duty to monitor supply. This is not only an engineering responsibility but is also that of each anaesthetist or intensivist. The clinical responsibility is to know how the gas supply system functions, to understand the significance of its warnings, and to ensure that each patient receives the appropriate supply correctly. Correct supply means checking the equipment before it is used on the patient and taking steps to monitor the supply as it is given to the patient. Gas supplies are available from two sources -pipelines and cylinders.
Pipelines
These should meet the Australian standard for pipelines (AS2896, Medical Gas Systems -Installation and Testing of Non-Flammable Medical Gas Pipeline Systems) which includes medical suction (vacuum). Although this standard does not cover all aspects of the problem, it does provide substantial protection. Medical gas pipelines have been a hazard to patients almost entirely from one of two causes; either they have delivered the wrong gas, or they have delivered no gas at all.
Delivery of the wrong gas, which has occurred in almost every country, is usually due to misconnection during installation, so that a gas other than oxygen is present in an oxygen pipeline. 1 • 2 Designed interconnection of air and oxygen has also caused suboxygenation. However, adherence to the design recommendations and testing requirements of AS2896 in Australia should effectively protect patients. The recommendation to have a medically qualified person such as an anaesthetist present at the final precommissioning check is most important.
Misfilling of a liquid oxygen Vacuum Insulated Evaporator (VIE) with nitrogen has been reported in North America,3 but currently in Australia there is a policy of dedicated supply road tankers with non-interchangeable couplings which physically prevents such misfilling. Similarly, with cylinders supplying pipelines, there are physical barriers to misconnection. Oxygen cylinders either have specific pin-indexing or a female 'bullnose' thread on a valve conforming to Australian Standard AS2473. The female thread is the same as industrial oxygen and air but medical air is now pin-indexed in all size cylinders. Nitrous oxide has a specific male instead of a female thread on the cylinder, so misconnection with air or oxygen cannot occur. It is, however, possible to connect industrial nitrogen, which is commonly used to power orthopaedic tools, onto the oxygen coupling, and this is one of the reasons the standard urges that only dry medical air be used for power tools.
The possibility of a failure of gas supply must always be anticipated. To avoid harm to patients, it is important that the anaesthetist or intensivist receive the earliest possible warning of impending failure. It is therefore essential that progressive warnings are provided. AS2896 requires that the normal supply pressures, including vacuum, are acknowledged with a green light. If the supply capacity is impaired, a flashing amber light is added and a warning alarm sounds (Table I ). The standard requires that these signals occur not only in the area responsible for maintaining supply, but also in areas such as the operating theatres, induction rooms and intensive care wards. This potential impairment of supply may occur when the VIE empties to a set low point, when the secondary cylinder bank takes over supply, or when the reserve compressor for medical breathing air or vacuum is actuated. In each instance there is no loss of supply, but only a loss of reserve.
Actual loss of supply pressure or vacuum to less than 80% of the working pressure, triggers a further warning. Now the green and amber lights are extinguished and are replaced by a flashing red light. The audible alarm continues. In addition to these alarms, the standard requires that instructions be sited near these alarms indicating the correct action to restore supply. It is important to ensure that these instructions are kept up-todate, as telephone numbers and personnel may change. 4 This graded monitoring of the pipeline allows time for an appropriate response and minimises the risk of harm to patients. Unfortunately many hospitals were built before the development and publication of the Australian standard and lack this gradation. Each hospital should examine its status with respect to AS2896. Those which do not comply should, as a minimal precaution, arrange for some graded system of warning in the appropriate areas.
This graded warning cannot be replaced by oxygen monitoring in the breathing circuit. The oxygen monitor is virtually a total failure warning and as such reduces the time available to manage the problem before patients are harmed. It also does not warn areas such as medical wards which may have patients dependent on oxygen. As well, it does not indicate the cause of the reduced oxygen supply and there are many ways sub-oxygenation may occur in the breathing circuit without any pipeline or supply fault. The two warning systems should be viewed as being complementary to each other, and not as alternatives.
Cylinders
Anaesthetic machines are sometimes used in locations beyond the supply of piped gases and require cylinders for the supply of gases during anaesthesia. Cylinders may also be attached to the machine as a backup in case of pipeline failure.
If cylinders are the sole source of oxygen, an oxygen pressure failure device such as a 'Howison', 'CrG BAllO' or 'Bosun' must be installed. Although an oxygen monitor in the breathing circuit would act as an alarm when an oxygen cylinder becomes empty, if the monitor is not attached or is not switched on, the patient is at great risk. Thus again, these two types of monitor should be viewed as being complementary to each other rather than as alternatives. All of the low pressure triggered types of alarms are self-activating and therefore less susceptible to operator error. The Howison or other interlocked systems are preferable but are not regarded as essential. Today few anaesthetics are given without nitrous oxide, and the main danger is the administration of a hypoxic anaesthetic gas mixture. If a machine is used only with a pipeline supply which is properly monitored, then the presence of a single oxygen cylinder at least 25% full is a sensible precaution. The Faculty of Anaesthetists has recommended that a reserve supply of oxygen and nitrous oxide be present on each anaesthetic machine. 5 If the anaesthetic machine in question is never to be used without piped gas, a machinemounted oxygen pressure failure device is not required as long as an oxygen analyser is used. The Faculty guidelines do require an oxygen failure warning device to be present on each anaesthetic machine. 5 
Oxygen analysers
The current technology is well established to provide accurate analysis of oxygen in the breathing circuit, and these devices are now the subject of a draft international standard (DIS 7767). The use of one of these devices is often loosely referred to as 'oxygen monitoring'. Although some analysers or monitors have been reported to be affected by agents such as water vapour, volatile agents,6 and nitrous oxide,7 most of the analysers available today are reasonably resistant to these effects. A useful summary of the performance of a range of oxygen analysers has recently been published in Australia. 8 The major value of oxygen monitoring lies in its ability to detect hypoxic mixtures. Because of the insidious nature and disastrous consequences of a hypoxic gas mixture being supplied to a patient, there was agreement at the meeting in May 1987 that an oxygen analyser should be used whenever an anaesthetic machine is in use. The sensor should be placed as close as possible to the patient in the breathing circuit.
The use of a pulse oximeter does not nullify this requirement, as each device provides different information. The oxygen analyser monitors the oxygen concentration in the patient's inspired gas, and is thus a machine and breathing circuit monitor, whereas the pulse oximeter monitors the patient's haemoglobin saturation, and, as a 'last-ditch' monitor of tissue oxygen delivery, will only provide a very late warning that something is wrong if a hypoxic gas mixture is supplied.
As available oxygen analysers are effective and relatively inexpensive, the recent meeting of 'Monitoring and Patient Safety' in Adelaide agreed that they should be available on every anaesthetic machine by the beginning of 1990. If there is a limited number of oxygen analysers in a hospital at some time between the present and 1990, then they should be used particularly with circle systems, especially with low fresh gas flows. Hypoxic mixtures are less likely when no nitrous oxide is being used, when the oxygen rotameter is downstream on the rotameter bank, and when a unit such as a 'Quantiflex' is used. When nonrebreathing circuits are in use, hypoxic mixtures are possible from accidental adjustments of nitrous oxide or oxygen rotameters ll or from oxygenselective leaks.9 Even a careful pressure check of the circuit may not detect all important leaks. 10 In intensive care, stable oxygen concentrations from air/oxygen mixtures are needed for long periods of time, and oxygen analysers should be used either continuously or intermittently on a regular basis to confirm the inspired oxygen concentration. If any change in concentration is made, the new concentration should be confirmed with an independent analyser. It must not be assumed that the dialled percentage ofthe mixer or blender is an accurate indicator.
Oxygen analysers have been the subject of a recent international standard. Generally they are reasonably stable and specific, but it is wise to check that any prospective purchase for use during anaesthesia is not affected by nitrous oxide or volatile anaesthetics. For both anaesthetic and intensive care use the analyser must at least have a low alarm. The alarm must be both visible and audible. It must be active as soon as the analyser is switched on and must have a minimum setting of not less than 17%. For anaesthesia, the analyser should have adjustable high and low alarms. Some means of checking the battery should be provided and low power should not result in false readings. A two-point calibration check (using air and oxygen) and a check of the low level alarm should be carried out before use.
Electrical supplies
Most hospital operating theatres and intensive care areas are protected by systems to the level of body protection (the old class B), or cardiac protection (the old class A). However, this is only an active protection and does not address the question of loss of supply. Loss of supply is probably a greater hazard than the risk of electrocution.
Loss of supply may be general or local. General loss of supply is usually obvious because both power and lighting are affected. The restoration of supply is usually prompt if an automatic emergency generator system has been installed. However, it is important that both anaesthetists and intensivists know if their areas have emergency power, when it is tested (if ever) and which sockets within the patient areas are supplied by the emergency generator system.
Locally, the mains supply is often monitored for current leakage by an 'Earth Leakage Core Balance' device or for earth isolation by a 'Line Isolation Monitor'. Rarely are alarms installed to warn of loss of power, Unfortunately many of the standard mains plugs will pull out of a three-pin socket under the weight of a metre or so of electrical flex. Such disconnection of the power supply of equipment is a serious hazard which has not been effectively tackled. One answer is to use a side plug where the cord is at a right-angle to the pins. However, the use of a side instead of a straight plug sometimes blocks an adjacent socket. Although the use of side plugs prevents disconnection from cord drag, it does not reduce the risk of disconnection at the equipment end. Perhaps monitoring equipment should alarm in some way if power is suddenly lost without it actually being switched off. This would also discourage the practice of depowering by 'pulling the plug'.
